A
Discourse of Government with Relation to Militias
by
Andrew Fletcher, 1698
[Copyright
© 1979 Scottish Academic Press. Permission to reprint
granted May 23, 1996 by Dr. Douglas Grant of the Scottish
Academic Press. Originally published as The
Political Works of Andrew Fletcher, Esq., London, 1732.
Reprinted as David Daiches,
Fletcher of Saltoun--Selected Writings (Scottish
Academic Press, Edinburgh 1979). Permission from
Scottish Academic Press to reprint this material, was
obtained by Dr. Bill Boyle of New Mexico State University
(bboyle@nmsu.edu). The original British style of spelling
has been retained (e.g., favour vs. favor). The word
"prentice" was changed to "apprentice"
in the two places where it occurred. The original
preference for lengthy paragraphs has likewise been
preserved.]
Fletcher
of Saltoun, Selected Writings
Last
two paragraphs of the Preface
A
full account of the political context within which
Fletcher's pamphlets and speeches were produced will be
found in the present writer's Scotland and the Union
(London, 1977).
The
text of the pamphlets and speeches here reprinted is taken
from The Political Works of Andrew Fletcher, Esq.,
London, 1732. This reprints accurately the original
pamphlets but with a somewhat more modern spelling and
punctuation. The Glasgow edition of 1749 is also an
accurate reprint but modernizes spelling and punctuation
rather more. The present text is therefore in the
tradition of continuous discreet modernising combined with
otherwise accurate reprinting, and it is hoped that it
will be accessible to a wider reading public than a simple
reproduction of the original pamphlets.(p.1)
A
Discourse of Government With Relation to Militias
Edinburgh;
Printed in the Year MDCXCVIII (p.2)
There
is not perhaps in human affairs anything so unaccountable
as the indignity and cruelty with which the far greater
part of mankind suffer themselves to be used under
pretence of government. For some men falsely persuading
themselves that bad governments are advantageous to them,
as most conducing to gratify their ambition, avarice, and
luxury, set themselves with the utmost art and violence to
procure their establishment: and by such men almost the
whole world has been trampled underfoot, and subjected to
tyranny, for want of understanding by what means and
methods they were enslaved. For though mankind take great
care and pains to instruct themselves in other arts and
sciences, yet very few apply themselves to consider the
nature of government, an enquiry so useful and necessary
both to magistrate and people. Nay, in most countries the
arts of state being altogether directed either to enslave
the people, or to keep them under slavery; it is become
almost everywhere a crime to reason about matters of
government. But if men would bestow a small part of the
time and application which they throw away upon curious
but useless studies, or endless gaming, in perusing those
excellent rules and examples of government which the
ancients have left us, they would soon be enabled to
discover all such abuses and corruptions as tend to the
ruin of public societies. It is therefore very strange
that they should think study and knowledge necessary in
everything they go about, except in the noblest and most
useful of all applications, the art of government.
Now
if any man in compassion to the miseries of a people
should endeavour to disabuse them in anything relating to
government, he will certainly incur the displeasure, and
perhaps be pursued by the rage of those, who think they
find their account in the oppression of the world; but
will hardly succeed in his endeavours to undeceive the
multitude. For the generality of all ranks of men are
cheated by words and names; and provided the ancient terms
and outward forms of any government be retained, let the
nature of it be never so much altered, (p.3)they continue
to dream that they shall still enjoy their former liberty,
an are not to be awakened till it prove too late. Of this
there are many remarkable examples in history; but that
particular instance which I have chosen to insist on, as
most suitable to my purpose, is the alteration of
government which happened in most countries of Europe
about the year 1500. And it is worth observation, that
though this change was fatal to their liberty, yet it was
not introduced by the contrivance of ill-designing men;
nor were the mischievous consequences perceived, unless
perhaps by a few wise men, who, if they saw it, wanted
power to prevent it.
Two
hundred years being already passed since this alteration
began, Europe has felt the effects of it by sad
experience; and the true causes of the change are now
become more visible.
To
lay open this matter in its full extent, it will be
necessary to look farther back, and examine the original
and constitution of those governments that were
established in Europe about the year 400, and continued
till this alteration.
When
the Goths, Vandals, and other warlike nations had, at
different times, and under different leaders, overrun the
western parts of the Roman empire, they introduced the
following form of government into all the nations they
subdued. The general of the army became king of the
conquered country; and the conquest being absolute, he
divided the lands amongst the great officers of his army,
afterwards called barons; who again parcelled out their
several territories in smaller portions to the inferior
soldiers that had followed them in the wars, and who then
became their vassals, enjoying those lands for military
service. The king reserved to himself some demesnes for
the maintenance of his court and attendance. When this was
done, there was no longer any standing army kept on foot,
but every man went to live upon his own lands; and when
the defence of the country required an army, the king
summoned the barons to his standard, who came attended
with their vassals. Thus were the armies of Europe
composed for about eleven hundred years; and this
constitution of government put the sword into the hands of
the subject, because the vassals depended more immediately
on the barons than on the king, which effectually secured
the freedom of those governments. For the barons could not
make use of their power to destroy those limited
monarchies, without destroying their own grandeur; nor
could the king invade their privileges, having no other
forces than the vassals of his own demesnes to rely upon
for his support in such an attempt.(p.4)
I lay
no great stress on any other limitations of those
monarchies; nor do I think any so essential to the
liberties of the people, as that which placed the sword in
the hands of the subject. And since in our time most
princes of Europe are in possession of the sword, by
standing mercenary forces kept up in time of peace,
absolutely depending upon them, I say that all such
governments are changed from monarchies to tyrannies. Nor
can the power of granting or refusing money, though vested
in the subject, be a sufficient security for liberty,
where a standing mercenary army is kept up in time of
peace: for he that is armed is always master of the purse
of him that is unarmed. And not only that government is
tyrannical, which is tyrannically exercised; but all
governments are tyrannical, which have not in their
constitution a sufficient security against the arbitrary
power of the prince.
I do
not deny that these limited monarchies, during the
greatness of the barons, had some defects: I know few
governments free from them. But after all, there was a
balance that kept those governments steady, and an
effectual provision against the encroachments of the
crown. I do less pretend that the present governments can
be restored to the constitution before-mentioned. The
following discourse will show the impossibility of it. My
design in the first place is to explain the nature of the
past and present governments of Europe, and to disabuse
those who think them the same, because they are called by
the same names; and who ignorantly clamour against such as
would preserve that liberty which is yet left.
In
order to this, and for a further and clearer illustration
of the matter, I shall deduce from their original, the
causes, occasions, and the complication of those many
unforeseen accidents; which falling out much about the
same time, produced so great a change. And it will at
first sight seem very strange, when I shall name the
restoration of learning, the invention of printing, of the
needle and of gunpowder, as the chief of them; things in
themselves so excellent, and which, the last only
excepted, might have proved of infinite advantage to the
world, if their remote influence upon government had been
obviated by suitable remedies. Such odd consequences, and
of such a different nature, accompany extraordinary
inventions of any kind.
Constantinople
being taken by Mahomet the second, in the year 1453, many
learned Greeks fled over into Italy; where the favourable
reception they found from the popes, princes, and
republics of that country, soon introduced amongst the
better sort of men, the study of the Greek tongue, and of
the ancient authors in that language. About (p.5)the same
time likewise some learned men began to restore the purity
of the Latin tongue. But that which most contributed to
the advancement of all kind of learning, and especially
the study of the ancients, was the art of printing; which
was brought to a great degree of perfection a few years
after. By this means their books became common, and their
arts generally understood and admired. But as mankind from
a natural propension to pleasure, is always ready to
choose out of everything what may most gratify that
vicious appetite; so the arts which the Italians first
applied themselves to improve were principally those that
had been subservient to the luxury of the ancients in the
most corrupt ages, of which they had many monuments still
remaining. Italy was presently filled with architects,
painters, and sculptors; and a prodigious expense was made
in buildings, pictures, and statues. Thus the Italians
began to come off from their frugal and military way of
living, and addicted themselves to the pursuit of refined
and expensive pleasures, as much as the wars of those
times would permit. This infection spread itself by
degrees into the neighbouring nations. But these things
alone had not been sufficient to work so great a change in
government, if a preceding invention, brought into common
use about that time, had not produced more new and
extraordinary effects than any had ever done before; which
probably may have many consequences yet unforeseen, and a
farther influence upon the manners of men, as long as the
world lasts; I mean, the invention of the needle, by the
help of which navigation was greatly improved, a passage
opened by sea to the East Indies, and a new world
discovered. By this means the luxury of Asia and America
was added to that of the ancients; and all ages, and all
countries concurred, to sink Europe into an abyss of
pleasures; which were rendered the more expensive by a
perpetual change of the fashions in clothes, equipage, and
furniture of houses.
These
things brought a total alteration in the way of living,
upon which all government depends. It is true, knowledge
being mightily increased, and a great curiosity and nicety
in everything introduced, men imagined themselves to be
gainers in all points, by changing from their frugal and
military way of living, which I must confess had some
mixture of rudeness and ignorance in it, though not
inseparable from it. But at the same time they did not
consider the unspeakable evils that are altogether
inseparable from an expensive way of living.
To
touch upon all these, though slightly, would carry me too
far from my subject: I shall therefore content myself to
apply what has been said, to the immediate design of this
discourse.(p.6)
The
far greater share of all those expenses fell upon the
barons; for they were the persons most able to make them,
and their dignity seemed to challenge whatever might
distinguish them from other men. This plunged them on a
sudden into so great debts, that if they did not sell, or
otherwise alienate their lands, they found themselves at
least obliged to turn the military service their vassals
owed them into money; partly by way of rent, and partly by
way of lease, or fine, for payment of their creditors. And
by this means the vassal having his lands no longer at so
easy a rate as before, could no more be obliged to
military service, and so became a tenant. Thus the armies,
which in preceding times had been always composed of such
men as these, ceased of course, and the sword fell out of
the hands of the barons. But there being always a
necessity to provide for the defence of every country,
princes were afterwards allowed to raise armies of
volunteers and mercenaries. And great sums were given by
diets and parliaments for their maintenance, to be levied
upon the people grown rich by trade, and dispirited for
want of military exercise. Such forces were at first only
raised for present exigencies, and continued no longer on
foot than the occasions lasted. But princes soon found
pretences to make them perpetual, the chief of which was
the garrisoning frontier towns and fortresses; the methods
of war being altered to the tedious and chargeable way of
sieges, principally by the invention of gunpowder. The
officers and soldiers of these mercenary armies depending
for their subsistence and preferment, as immediately upon
the prince, as the former militias did upon the barons,
the power of the sword was transferred from the subject to
the king, and war grew a constant trade to live by. Nay,
many of the barons themselves being reduced to poverty by
their expensive way of living, took commands in those
mercenary troops; and being still continued hereditary
members of diets, and other assemblies of state, after the
loss of their vassals, whom they formerly represented,
they were now the readiest of all others to load the
people with heavy taxes, which were employed to increase
the prince's military power, by guards, armies, and
citadels, beyond bounds or remedy.
Some
princes with much impatience pressed on to arbitrary power
before things were ripe, as the kings of France and
Charles duke of Burgundy. Philip de Commines says of the
latter, 'That having made a truce with the King of France
he called an assembly of the estates of his country, and
remonstrated to them the prejudice he had sustained by not
having standing troops as that king had; that if five
(p.7)hundred men had been in garrison upon their frontier,
the king of France would never have undertaken that war;
and having represented the mischiefs that were ready to
fall upon them for want of such a force, he earnestly
pressed them to grant such a sum as would maintain eight
hundred lances. At length they gave him a hundred and
twenty thousand crowns more than his ordinary revenue
(from which tax Burgundy_ was exempted). But his subjects
were for many reasons under great apprehensions of falling
into the subjection to which they saw the kingdom of
France already reduced by means of such troops. And truly
their apprehensions were not ill-grounded; for when he had
got together five or six hundred men at arms, he presently
had a mind to more, and with them disturbed the peace of
all his neighbours: he augmented the tax from one hundred
and twenty to five hundred thousand crowns, and increased
the numbers of those men at arms, by whom his subjects
were greatly oppressed.' Francis de Beaucaire, bishop of
Metz, in his history of France speaking of the same
affair, says, 'That the foresaid states could not be
induced to maintain mercenary forces, being sensible of
the difficulties into which thecommonalty of France had
brought themselves by the like concession; that princes
might increase their forces at pleasure, and sometimes
(even when they had obtained money)'pay them ill, to the
vexation and destruction of the poor people; and likewise
that kings and princes not contented with their ancient
patrimony, were always ready under this pretext to break
in upon the properties of all men, and to raise what money
they pleased. That nevertheless they gave him a hundred
and twenty thousand crowns yearly, which he soon increased
to five hundred thousand: but that Burgundy (which was the
ancient dominion of that family) retained its ancient
liberty, and could by no means be obliged to pay any part
of this new tax.' it is true, Philip de Commines subjoins
to the forecited passage, that he believes standing forces
may be well employed under a wise king or prince; but that
if he be not so, or leaves his children young, the use
that he or their governors make of them, is not always
profitable either for the king or his subjects. If this
addition be his own, and not rather an insertion added by
the president of the parliament of Paris, who published
and, as the foresaid Francis de Beaucaire says he was
credibly informed, corrupted his memoirs, yet experience
shows him to be mistaken: for the example of his master
Louis the eleventh, whom upon many occasions he calls a
wise prince, and those of most princes under whom standing
forces were first allowed, demonstrates, that they are
more dangerous under a wise (p.8)prince than any other:
and reason tells us, that if they are the only proper
instruments to introduce arbitrary power, as shall be made
plain, a cunning and able prince, who by the world is
called a wise one, is more capable of using them to that
end than a weak prince, or governors during a minority;
and that a wise prince having once procured them to be
established, they will maintain themselves under any.
I am
not ignorant that before this change, subsidies were often
given by diets, states, and parliaments, and some raised
by the edicts of princes for maintaining wars; but these
were small, and no way sufficient to subsist such numerous
armies as those of the barons' militia. There were
likewise mercenary troops sometimes entertained by princes
who aimed at arbitrary power, and by some commonwealths in
time of war for their own defence; but these were only
strangers, or in very small numbers, and held no
proportion with those vast armies of mercenaries which
this change has fixed upon Europe to her affliction and
ruin.
What
I have said hitherto has been always with regard to one or
other, and often to most countries in Europe. What follows
will have a more particular regard to Britain; where,
though the power of the barons be ceased, yet no mercenary
troops are yet established. The reason of which is, that
England had before this great alteration lost all her
conquests in France, the town of Calais only excepted; and
that also was taken by the French before the change was
thoroughly made. So that the Kings of England had no
pretence to keep up standing forces, either to defend
conquests abroad or to garrison a frontier towards France,
since the sea was now become the only frontier between
those two countries.
Neither
could the frontier towards Scotland afford any colour to
those princes for raising such forces, since the Kings of
Scotland had none; and that Scotland was not able to give
money for the subsisting any considerable number. It is
true, the example of France, with which country Scotland
had constant correspondence, and some French counsellors
about Mary of Guise, Queen dowager and regent of Scotland,
induced her to propose a tax for the subsisting of
mercenary soldiers to be employed for the defence of the
frontier of Scotland; and to ease, as was pretended, the
barons of that trouble. But in that honourable and wise
remonstrance, which was made by three hundred of the
lesser barons (as much dissatisfied with the lords, who by
their silence betrayed the public liberty, as with the
Regent herself) she was (p.9)told, that their forefathers
had defended themselves and their fortunes against the
English, when that nation was much more powerful than they
were at that time, and had made frequent incursions into
their country: that they themselves had not so far
degenerated from their ancestors, to refuse, when occasion
required, to hazard their lives and fortunes in the
service of their country: that as to the hiring of
mercenary soldiers, it was a thing of great danger to put
the liberty of Scotland into the hands of men, who are of
no fortunes, nor have any hopes but in the public
calamity; who for money would attempt anything; whose
excessive avarice opportunity would inflame to a desire of
all manner of innovations, and whose faith would follow
the wheel of fortune. That though these men should be more
mindful of the duty they owe to their country, than of
their own particular interest, was it to be supposed, that
mercenaries would fight more bravely for the defence of
other men's fortunes, than the possessors would do for
themselves or their own; or that a little money should
excite their ignoble minds to a higher pitch of honour
than that with which the barons are inspired, when they
fight for the preservation of their fortunes, wives and
children, religion and liberty: that most men did suspect
and apprehend, that this new way of making war, might be
not only useless, but dangerous to the nation; since the
English, if they should imitate the example, might,
without any great trouble to their people, raise far
greater sums for the maintenance of mercenary soldiers,
than Scotland could, and by this means not only spoil and
lay open the frontier, but penetrate into the bowels of
the kingdom: and that it was in the militia of the barons
their ancestors had placed their chief trust, for the
defence of themselves against a greater power.
By
these powerful reasons being made sensible of her error,
the Queen desisted from her demands. Her daughter Queen
Mary, who, as the great historian says, looked upon the
moderate government of a limited kingdom, to be
disgraceful to monarchs, and upon the slavery of the
people, as the freedom of kings, resolved to have guards
about her person; but could not fall upon a way to compass
them: for she could find no pretext, unless it were the
empty show of magnificence which belongs to a court, and
the example of foreign princes; for the former kings had
always trusted themselves to the faith of the barons. At
length upon a false and ridiculous pretence, of an
intention in a certain nobleman to seize her person, she
assumed them; but they were soon abolished. Nor had her
son King James any other guards whilst he was King of
Scotland only, than forty gentlemen: and that (p.10)King
declares in the act of parliament, by which they are
established, that he will not burden his people by any tax
or imposition for their maintenance.
Henry
the seventh, King of England, seems to have perceived
sooner, and understood better the alteration
before-mentioned, than any prince of his time, and
obtained several laws to favour and facilitate it. But his
successors were altogether improper to second him: for
Henry the eighth was an unthinking prince. The reigns of
Edward the sixth and Queen Mary were short; and Queen
Elizabeth loved her people too well to attempt it. King
James, who succeeded her, was a stranger in England, and
of no interest abroad. King Charles the first did indeed
endeavour to make himself absolute, though somewhat
preposterously; for he attempted to seize the purse,
before he was master of the sword. But very wise men have
been of opinion, that if he had been possessed of as
numerous guards as those which were afterwards raised, and
constantly kept up by King Charles the second, he might
easily have succeeded in his enterprise. For we see that
in those struggles which the country party had with King
Charles the second, and in those endeavours they used to
bring about that revolution which was afterwards compassed
by a foreign power, the chief and insuperable difficulty
they met with, was from those guards. And though King
James the second had provoked these nations to the last
degree, and made his own game as hard as possible, not
only by invading our civil liberties, but likewise by
endeavouring to change the established religion for
another which the people abhorred, whereby he lost their
affections, and even those of a great part of his army:
yet notwithstanding all this mismanagement, Britain stood
in need of a foreign force to save it; and how dangerous a
remedy that is, the histories of all ages can witness. It
is true, this circumstance was favourable, that a prince
who had married the next heir to these kingdoms, was at
the head of our deliverance: yet did it engage us in a
long and expensive war. And now that we are much
impoverished, and England by means of her former riches
and present poverty, fallen into all the corruptions which
those great enemies of virtue, want, and excess of riches
can produce; that there are such numbers of mercenary
forces on foot at home and abroad; that the greatest part
of the officers have no other way to subsist; that they
are commanded by a wise and active King, who has at his
disposal the formidable land and sea forces of a
neighbouring nation, the great rival of our trade; a King,
who by blood, relation, other particular ties, and common
interest, has the house of (p.11)Austria, most of the
princes of Germany, and potentates of the North, for his
friends and allies; who can, whatever interest he join
with, do what he thinks fit in Europe; I say, if a
mercenary standing army be kept up (the first of that
kind, except those of the usurper Cromwell, and the late
King James, that Britain has seen for thirteen hundred
years) I desire to know where the security of the British
liberties lies, unless in the good will and pleasure of
the King: I desire to know, what real security can be had
against standing armies of mercenaries, backed by the
corruption of both nations, the tendency of the way of
living, the genius of the age, and the example of the
world.
Having
shown the difference between the past and present
government of Britain, how precarious our liberties are,
and how from having the best security for them we arc in
hazard of having none at all; it is to be hoped that those
who are for a standing army, and losing no occasion of
advancing and extending the prerogative, from a mistaken
opinion that they establish the ancient government of
these nations, will see what sort of patriots they are.
But
we are told, that only standing mercenary forces can
defend Britain from the perpetual standing armies of
France. However frivolous this assertion be, as indeed no
good argument can be brought to support it, either from
reason or experience, as shall be proved hereafter; yet
allowing it to be good, what security can the nations have
that these standing forces shall not at some time or other
be made use of to suppress the liberties of the people,
though not in this king's time, to whom we owe their
preservation? For I hope there is no man so weak to think,
that keeping up the army for a year, or for any longer
time than the parliaments of both nations shall have
engaged the public faith to make good all deficiencies of
funds granted for their maintenance, is not the keeping
them up for ever. It is a pitiful shift in the undertakers
for a standing army, to say, we are not for a standing
army, we are only for an army from year to year, or till
the militia be made useful. For Britain cannot be in any
hazard from France; at least till that kingdom, so much
exhausted by war and persecution, shall have a breathing
space to recover. Before that time our militias will be in
order; and in the meantime the fleet. Besides, no prince
ever surrendered so great countries and so many strong
places, I shall not say, in order to make a new war; but
as these men will have it, to continue the same. The
French King is old and diseased, and was never willing to
hazard much by any bold attempt. If he, or the dauphin,
upon his (p.12)decease, may be suspected of any farther
design, it must be upon the Spanish monarchy, in case of
the death of that King. And if it be objected, that we
shall stand in need of an army, in such a conjuncture, I
answer, that our part in that, or in any other foreign
war, will be best managed by sea, as shall be shown
hereafter.
Let
us then see if mercenary armies be not exactly calculated
to enslave a nation. Which I think may be easily proved,
if we consider that such troops are generally composed of
men who make a trade of war; and having little or no
patrimony, or spent what they once had, enter into that
employment in hopes of its continuance during life, not at
all thinking how to make themselves capable of any other.
By which means heavy and perpetual taxes must be entailed
for ever upon the people for their subsistence; and since
all their relations stand engaged to support their
interest, let all men judge, if this will not prove a very
united and formidable party in a nation.
But
the undertakers must pardon me if I tell them, that no
well-constituted government ever suffered any such men in
it, whose interest leads them to embroil the state in war,
and are a useless and insupportable burden in time of
peace. Venice or Holland are neither of them examples to
prove the contrary; for had not their situation been
different from that of other countries, their liberty had
not continued to this time. And they suffer no forces to
remain within those inaccessible places, which are the
chief seats of their power. Carthage, that had not those
advantages of situation, and yet used mercenary forces,
was brought to the brink of ruin by them in a time of
peace, beaten in three wars, and at last subdued by the
Romans. If ever any government stood in need of such a
sort of men, it was that of ancient Rome, because they
were engaged in perpetual war. The argument can never be
so strong in any other case. But the Romans well knowing
such men and liberty to be incompatible, and yet being
under a necessity of having armies constantly on foot,
made frequent changes of the men that served in them; who,
when they had been some time in the army, were permitted
to return to their possessions, trades, or other
employments. And to show how true a judgment that wise
state made of this matter, it is sufficient to observe,
that those who subverted that government, the greatest
that ever was amongst men, found themselves obliged to
continue the same soldiers always in constant pay and
service.
If
during the late war we had followed so wise a course as
that of Rome, there had been thrice as many trained men in
the nations as at (p.13)present there are; no difficulties
about recruits, nor debates about keeping up armies in
time of peace, because some men resolve to live by arms in
time of peace, whether it be for the good of the nations
or not. And since such was the practice of Rome, I hope no
man will have the confidence to say that this method was
not as effectual for war as any other. If it be objected
that Rome had perpetual wars, and therefore that might be
a good practice among them, which would not be so with us,
I confess I cannot see the consequence; for if Rome had
perpetual wars, the Romans ought still to have continued
the same men in their armies, that they might, according
to the notion of these men, render their troops more
useful. And if we did change our men during a war, we
should have more men that would understand something of
it. If any man say, not so much as if they continued in
the army: I answer, that many of those who continue in the
army are afterwards swept away by the war, and live not to
be of use in time of peace; that those who escape the war,
being fewer than in the other case, are soon consumed: and
that mercenary standing forces in time of peace, if not
employed to do mischief, soon become like those of Holland
in 72, fit only to lose forty strong places in forty days.
There
is another thing which I would not mention if it were not
absolutely necessary to my present purpose; and that is,
the usual manners of those who are engaged in mercenary
armies. I speak now of officers in other parts of Europe,
and not of those in our armies, allowing them to be the
best, and if they will have it so, quite different from
all others. I will not apply to them any part of what I
shall say concerning the rest. They themselves best know
how far anything of that nature may be applicable to them.
I say then, most princes of Europe having put themselves
upon the foot of keeping up forces, rather numerous than
well entertained, can give but small allowance to
officers, and that likewise is for the most part very ill
paid, in order to render them the more necessitous and
depending; and yet they permit them to live inall that
extravagancy which mutual example and emulation prompts
them to. By which means the officers become insensibly
engaged in numberless frauds, oppressions, and cruelties,
the colonels against the captains, and the captains
against the inferior soldiers; and all of them against all
persons with whom they have any kind of business. So that
there is hardly any sort of men who are less men of honour
than the officers of mercenary forces: and indeed honour
has now no other signification amongst them than courage.
Besides, most men that enter into those armies, whether
officers or (p.14)soldiers, as if they were obliged to
show themselves new creatures, and perfectly regenerate,
if before they were modest or sober, immediately turn
themselves to all manner of debauchery and wickedness,
committing all kinds of injustice and barbarity against
poor and defenceless people. Now though the natural temper
of our men be more just and honest than that of the
French, or of any other people, yet may it not be feared,
that such bad manners may prove contagious? And if such
manners do not fit men to enslave a nation, devils only
must do it. on the other hand, if it should happen that
the officers of standing armies in Britain should live
with greater regularity and modesty than was ever yet seen
in that sort of men, it might very probably fall out, that
being quartered in all parts of the country, some of them
might be returned members of parliament for divers of the
electing boroughs; and of what consequence that would be,
I leave all men to judge. So that whatever be the conduct
of a mercenary army, we can never be secure as long as any
such force is kept up in Britain.
But
the undertakers for a standing army will say: will you
turn so many gentlemen to starve, who have faithfully
served the government? This question I allow to be founded
upon some reason. For it ought to be acknowledged in
justice to our soldiery, that on all occasions, and in all
actions, both officers and soldiers have done their part;
and therefore I think it may be reasonable, that all
officers and soldiers of above forty years, in
consideration of their unfitness to apply themselves at
that age to any other employment, should be recommended to
the bounty of both parliaments.
I
confess I do not see by what rules of good policy any
mercenary forces have been connived at either in Scotland,
England, or Ireland. Sure, it is allowing the dispensing
power in the most essential point of the constitution of
government in these nations.
Scotland
and England are nations that were formerly very jealous of
liberty; of which there are many remarkable instances in
the histories of these countries. And we may hope that the
late revolution having given such a blow to arbitrary
power in these kingdoms, they will be very careful to
preserve their rights and privileges. And sure it is not
very suitable to these, that any standing forces be kept
up in Britain: or that there should be any Scots, English,
or Irish regiments maintained in Ireland, or anywhere
abroad; or regiments of any nation at the charge of
England. I shall not say how readily the regiments that
were in the service of Holland came over against the duke
of Monmouth: he was a rebel, and did not succeed. But we
all know with (p.15)what expedition the Irish mercenary
forces were brought into Britain to oppose his present
majesty in that glorious enterprise for our deliverance.
The
subjects formerly had a real security for their liberty,
by having the sword in their own hands. That security,
which is the greatest of all others, is lost; and not only
so, but the sword is put into the hand of the king by his
power over the militia. All this is not enough; but we
must have in both kingdoms standing armies of mercenaries,
who for the most part have no other way to subsist, and
consequently are capable to execute any commands: and yet
every man must think his liberties as safe as ever, under
pain of being thought disaffected to the monarchy. But
sure it must not be the ancient limited and legal
monarchies of Scotland and England that these gentlemen
mean. It must be a French fashion of monarchy, where the
king has power to do what he pleases, and the people no
security for anything they possess. We have quitted our
ancient security, and put the militia into the power of
the king. The only remaining security we have is, that no
standing armies were ever yet allowed in time of peace,
the parliament of England having so often and so expressly
declared them to be contrary to law: and that of Scotland
having not only declared them to be a grievance, but made
the keeping them up an article in the forfeiture of the
late King James. If a standing army be allowed, what
difference will there be between the government we shall
then live under, and any kind of government under a good
prince? Of which there have been some in the most despotic
tyrannies. If these be limited and not absolute
monarchies, then, as there are conditions, so there ought
to be securities on both sides. The barons never pretended
that their militias should be constantly on foot, and
together in bodies in times of peace. It is evident that
would have subverted the constitution, and made every one
of them a petty tyrant. And it is as evident, that
standing forces are the fittest instruments to make a
tyrant. Whoever is for making the king's power too great
or too little, is an enemy to the monarchy. But to give
him standing armies, puts his power beyond control, and
consequently makes him absolute. If the people had any
other real security for their liberty than that there be
no standing armies in time of peace, there might be some
colour to demand them. But if that only remaining security
be taken away from the people, we have destroyed these
monarchies.
It is
pretended we are in hazard of being invaded by a powerful
enemy; shall we therefore destroy our government? What is
it then (p.16)that we would defend? Is it our persons, by
the ruin of our government? in what then shall we be
gainers? In saving our lives by the loss of our liberties?
if our pleasures and luxury make us live like brutes, it
seems we must not pretend to reason any better than they.
I would fain know, if there be any other way of making a
prince absolute, than by allowing him a standing army: if
by it all princes have not been made absolute; if without
it, any. Whether our enemies shall conquer us is
uncertain; but whether standing armies will enslave us,
neither reason nor experience will suffer us to doubt. It
is therefore evident that no pretence of danger from
abroad can be an argument to keep up standing armies or
any mercenary forces.
Let
us now consider whether we may not be able to defend
ourselves by well-regulated militias against any foreign
force, though never so formidable: that these nations may
be free from the fears of invasion from abroad, as well as
from the danger of slavery at home.
After
the barons had lost the military service of their vassals,
militias of some kind or other were established in most
parts of Europe. But the prince having everywhere the
power of naming and preferring the officers of these
militias, they could be no balance in government as the
former were. And he that will consider what has been said
in this discourse, will easily perceive that the essential
quality requisite to such a militia, as might fully answer
the ends of the former, must be, that the officers should
be named and preferred, as well as they and the soldiers
paid, by the people that set them out. So that if princes
look upon the present militias as not capable of defending
a nation against foreign armies, the people have little
reason to entrust them with the defence of their
liberties.
And
though upon the dissolution of that ancient militia under
the barons, which made these nations so great and
glorious, by setting up militias generally through Europe,
the sword came not into the hands of the Commons, which
was the only thing could have continued the former balance
of government, but was everywhere put into the hands of
the king: nevertheless ambitious princes, who aimed at
absolute power, thinking they could never use it
effectually to that end, unless it were wielded by
mercenaries, and men that had no other interest in the
commonwealth than their pay, have still endeavoured by all
means to discredit militias, and render them burdensome to
the people, by never suffering them to be upon any right,
or so much as tolerable foot, and all to persuade the
necessity of standing forces. And indeed (p.17)they have
succeeded too well in this design: for the greatest part
of the world has been fooled into an opinion that a
militia cannot be made serviceable. I shall not say it was
only militias could conquer the world; and that princes to
have succeeded fully in the design before-mentioned must
have destroyed all the history and memory of ancient
governments, where the accounts of so many excellent
models of militia are yet extant. I know the prejudice and
ignorance of the world concerning the art of war, as it
was practised by the ancients; though what remains of that
knowledge in their writings be sufficient to give a mean
opinion of the modem discipline. For this reason I shall
examine, by what has passed of late years in these
nations, whether experience have convinced us, that
officers bred in foreign wars, be so far preferable to
others who have been under no other discipline than that
of an ordinary and ill-regulated militia; and if the
commonalty of both kingdoms, at their first entrance upon
service, be not as capable of a resolute military action,
as any standing forces. This doubt will be fully resolved,
by considering the actions of the marquis of Montrose,
which may be compared, all circumstances considered, with
those of Caesar, as well for the military skill, as the
bad tendency of them; though the marquis had never served
abroad, nor seen any action, before the six victories,
which, with numbers much inferior to those of his enemies,
he obtained in one year; and the most considerable of them
were chiefly gained by the assistance of the tenants and
vassals of the family of Gordon. The battle of Naseby will
be a farther illustration of this matter, which is
generally thought to have been the deciding action of the
late civil war. The number of forces was equal on both
sides; nor was there any advantage in the ground, or
extraordinary accident that happened during the fight,
which could be of considerable importance to either. In
the army of the parliament, nine only of the officers had
served abroad, and most of the soldiers were apprentices
drawn out of London but two months before. In the king's
army there were above a thousand officers that had served
in foreign parts: yet was that army routed and broken by
those new-raised apprentices; who were observed to be
obedient to command, and brave in fight; not only in that
action, but on all occasions during that active campaign.
The people of these nations are not a dastardly crew, like
those born in misery under oppression and slavery, who
must have time to rub off that fear, cowardice, and
stupidity which they bring from home. And though officers
seem to stand in more need of experience than private
soldiers; yet in that battle it was seen that the sobriety
and (p.18)principle of the officers on the one side,
prevailed over the experience of those on the other.
It is
well known that divers regiments of our army, lately in
Flanders, have never been once in action, and not one half
of them above thrice, nor any of them five times during
the whole war. Oh, but they have been under discipline,
and accustomed to obey! And so may men in militias. We
have had to do with an enemy, who, though abounding in
numbers of excellent officers, yet durst never fight us
without a visible advantage. Is that enemy like to invade
us, when he must be unavoidably necessitated to put all to
hazard in ten days, or starve?
A
good militia is of such importance to a nation, that it is
the chief part of the constitution of any free government.
For though as to other things, the constitution be never
so slight, a good militia will always preserve the public
liberty. But in the best constitution that ever was, as to
all other parts of government, if the militia be not upon
a right foot, the liberty of that people must perish. The
militia of ancient Rome, the best that ever was in any
government, made her mistress of the world: but standing
armies enslaved that great people, and their excellent
militia and freedom perished together. The Lacedemonians
continued eight hundred years free, and in great honour,
because they had a good militia. The Swisses at this day
are the freest, happiest, and the people of all Europe who
can best defend themselves, because they have the best
militia.
I
have shown that liberty in the monarchical governments of
Europe, subsisted so long as the militia of the barons was
on foot: and that on the decay of their militia (which
though it was none of the best, so was it none of the
worst) standing forces and tyranny have been everywhere
introduced, unless in Britain and Ireland; which by reason
of their situation, having the sea for frontier, and a
powerful fleet to protect them, could afford no pretence
for such forces. And though any militia, however slightly
constituted, be sufficient for that reason to defend us;
yet all improvements in the constitution of militias,
being further securities for the liberty of the people, I
think we ought to endeavour the amendment of them, and
till that can take place, to make the present militias
useful in the former and ordinary methods.
That
the whole free people of any nation ought to be exercised
to arms, not only the example of our ancestors, as appears
by the acts of parliament made in both kingdoms to that
purpose, and that of the (p.19)wisest governments among
the ancients; but the advantage of choosing out of great
numbers, seems clearly to demonstrate. For in countries
where husbandry, trade, manufactures, and other mechanical
arts are carried on, even in time of war, the impediments
of men are so many and so various, that unless the whole
people be exercised, no considerable numbers of men can be
drawn out, without disturbing those employments, which are
the vitals of the political body. Besides, that upon great
defeats, and under extreme calamities, from which no
government was ever exempted, every nation stands in need
of all the people, as the ancients sometimes did of their
slaves. And I cannot see why arms should be denied to any
man who is not a slave, since they are the only true
badges of liberty; and ought never, but in times of utmost
necessity, to be put into the hands of mercenaries or
slaves: neither can I understand why any man that has arms
should not be taught the use of them.
By
the constitution of the present militia in both nations,
there is but a small number of the men able to bear arms
exercised; and men of quality and estate are allowed to
send any wretched servant in their place: so that they
themselves are become mean, by being disused to handle
arms; and will not learn the use of them, because they are
ashamed of their ignorance: by which means the militias
being composed only of servants, these nations seem
altogether unfit to defend themselves, and standing forces
to be necessary. Now can it be supposed that a few
servants will fight for the defence of their masters'
estates, if their masters only look on? Or that some
inconsiderate freeholders, as for the most part those who
command the militia are, should, at the head of those
servants, expose their lives for men of more plentiful
estates, without being assisted by them? No bodies of
military men can be of any force or value, unless many
persons of quality or education be among them; and such
men should blush to think of excusing themselves from
serving their country, at least for some years, in a
military capacity, if they consider that every Roman was
obliged to spend fifteen years of his life in their
armies. Is it not a shame that any man who possesses an
estate, and is at the same time healthful and young,
should not fit himself by all means for the defence of
that, and his country, rather than to pay taxes to
maintain a mercenary, who though he may defend Mm during a
war, will be sure to insult and enslave him in time of
peace. Men must not think that any country can be in a
constant posture of defence, without some trouble and
charge; but certainly it is better to undergo this, and to
preserve (p.20)our liberty with honour, than to be
subjected to heavy taxes, and yet have it insolently
ravished from us, to our present oppression, and the
lasting misery of our posterity. But it will be said,
where are the men to be found who shall exercise all this
people in so many several places at once? for the nobility
and gentry know nothing of the matter; and to hire so many
soldiers of fortune, as they call them, will bechargeable,
and may be dangerous, these men being all mercenaries, and
always the same men, in the same trusts: besides that the
employing such men would not be suitable to the design of
breeding the men of quality and estate to command, as well
as the others to obey.
To
obviate these difficulties, and because the want of a good
model of militia, and a right method for training people
in time of peace, so as they need not apprehend any war,
though never so sudden, is at this day the bane of the
liberty of Europe, I shall propose one, accommodated to
the invincible difficulty of bringing men of quality and
estate, or men of any rank, who have passed the time of
youth, to the use of arms; and new, because though we have
many excellent models of militia, delivered to us by
ancient authors, with respect to the use of them in time
of war, yet they give us but little information concerning
the methods by which they trained their whole people for
war in time of peace; so that if the model which I shall
propose have not the authority of the ancients to
recommend it, yet perhaps by a severe discipline, and a
right method of disposing the minds of men, as well as
forming their bodies, for military and virtuous actions,
it may have some resemblance of their excellent
institutions.
What
I would offer is, that four camps be formed, one in
Scotland, and three in England; into which all the young
men of the respective countries should enter, on the first
day of the two and twentieth year of their age; and remain
there the space of two years, if they be of fortunes
sufficient to maintain themselves; but if they are not,
then to remain a year only, at the expense of the public.
In this camp they should be taught the use of all sorts of
arms, with the necessary evolutions; as also wrestling,
leaping, swimming, and the like exercises. He whose
condition would permit him to buy and maintain a horse,
should be obliged so to do, and be taught to vault, to
ride, and to manage his own horse. This camp should seldom
remain above eight days in one place, but remove from
heath to heath; not only upon the account of cleanliness
and health, but to teach the youth to fortify a camp, to
march, and to accustom them (respect being always had to
those of a weak constitution) to carry as much in their
march as ever (p.21)any Roman soldier did; that is to say,
their tents, provision, arms, armour, their utensils, and
the palisades of their camp. They should be taught to
forage, and be obliged to use the countrymen with all
justice in their bargains, for that and all other things
they stand in need of from them. The food of every man
within the camp should be the same; for bread they should
have only wheat, which they are to be obliged to grind
with hand-mills; they should have some salt, and a certain
number of beeves allowed them at certain times of the
year. Their drink should be water, sometimes tempered with
a proportion of brandy, and at other times with vinegar.
Their clothes should be plain, coarse, and of a fashion
fitted in everything for the fatigue of a camp. For all
these things those who could should pay; and those who
could not should be defrayed by the public, as has been
said. The camp should be sometimes divided into two parts,
which should remove from each other many miles, and should
break up again at the same time, in order to meet upon
some mountainous, marshy, woody, or in a word, cross
ground; that not only their diligence, patience, and
suffering in marches, but their skill in seizing of
grounds, posting bodies of horse and foot, and advancing
towards each other; their choosing a camp, and drawing out
of it in order to a battle, might be seen, as well as what
orders of battle they would form upon the variety of
different grounds. The persons of quality or estate should
likewise be instructed in fortification, gunnery, and all
things belonging to the duty of an engineer: and forts
should be sometimes built by the whole camp, where all the
arts of attacking and defending places should be practised.
The youth having been taught to read at schools, should be
obliged to read at spare hours some excellent histories,
but chiefly those in which military actions are best
described; with the books that have been best written
concerning the military art. Speeches exhorting to
military and virtuous actions should be often composed,
and pronounced publicly by such of the youth as were, by
education and natural talents, qualified for it. There
being none but military men allowed within the camp, and
no churchmen being of that number, such of the youth as
may be fit to exhort the rest to all Christian and moral
duties, chiefly to humility, modesty, charity, and the
pardoning of private injuries, should be chosen to do it
every Sunday, and the rest of that day spent in reading
books, and in conversation directed to the same end. And
all this under so severe and rigorous orders, attended
with so exact an execution by reward and punishment, that
no officer within the camp should have the power of
pardoning the one, or withholding the other. (p.22)The
rewards should be all honorary, and contrived to suit the
nature of the different good qualities and degrees in
which any of the youth had shown, either his modesty,
obedience, patience in suffering, temperance, diligence,
address, invention, judgment, temper, or valour. The
punishments should be much more rigorous than those
inflicted for the same crimes by the law of the land. And
there should be punishments for some things, not liable to
any by the common law, immodest and insolent words or
actions, gaming, and the like. No woman should be suffered
to come within the camp, and the crimes of abusing their
own bodies any manner of way, punished with death. All
these things to be judged by their own councils of war;
and those councils to have for rule, certain articles
drawn up and approved by the respective parliaments. The
officers and masters, for instructing and teaching the
youth, in all the exercises above-mentioned, should upon
the first establishment of such a camp, be the most expert
men in those disciplines; and brought by encouragements
from all places of Europe; due care being taken that they
should not indict the youth with foreign manners. But
afterwards they ought to consist of such men of quality or
fortune as should be chosen for that end, out of those who
had formerly passed two years in the camp, and since that
time had improved themselves in the wars; who upon their
return should be obliged to serve two years in that
station. As for the numbers of those officers, or masters;
their several duties; that of the camp-master-general, and
of the commissaries; the times and manner of exercise,
with divers other particulars of less consideration, and
yet necessary to be determined, in order to put such a
design in execution, for brevity's sake I omit them, as
easy to be resolved. But certainly it were no hard matter,
for men that had passed through such a discipline as that
of the camp I have described, to retain it after they
should return to their several homes; if the people of
every town and village, together with those of the
adjacent habitations, were obliged to meet fifty times in
the year, on such days as should be found most convenient;
and exercise four hours every time: for all men being
instructed in what they are to do; and the men of quality
and estate most knowing, and expert of all others, the
exercise might be performed in great perfection. There
might also be yearly in the summer time, a camp of some
thousands of the nearest neighbours brought and kept
together for a week to do those exercises, which cannot be
performed in any other place: every man of a certain
estate being obliged to keep a horse fit for the war. By
this means it would be easy upon any occasion, though
(p.23)never so small (as for example, the keeping of the
peace, and putting the laws in execution where force is
necessary) or never so great and sudden (as upon account
of invasions and conspiracies) to bring together such
numbers of officers and soldiers as the exigence required,
according to the practice of ancient Rome; which in this
particular might be imitated by us without difficulty: and
if such a method were once established, there would be no
necessity of keeping up a militia formed into regiments of
foot and horse in time of peace. Now if this militia
should stand in need of any farther improvement (because
no militias seem comparable to those exercised in actual
war; as that of the barons by their constant feuds; and
that of Rome, and some other ancient commonwealths, by
their perpetual wars) a certain small number of forces
might be employed in any foreign country where there
should be action; a fourth part of which might be changed
every year; that all those who had in this manner acquired
experience, might be dispersed among the several regiments
of any army, that the defence of these countries should at
any time call for; which would serve to confirm and give
assurance to the rest. Such a militia would be of no great
expense to these nations; for the mean clothing and
provisions for those who could not maintain themselves,
being given only for one year, would amount to little; and
no other expense would be needful, except for their arms,
a small train of artillery for each camp, and what is to
be given for the encouragement of the first officers and
masters.
A
militia upon such a foot would have none of the infinite
and insuperable difficulties there are, to bring a few men
who live at a great distance from one another, frequently
together to exercise; at which consequently they must be
from home every time several days: of finding such a
number of masters, as are necessary to train so many
thousands of people ignorant of all exercise, in so many
different places, and for the most part at the same time:
it would have none of those innumerable encumbrances, and
unnecessary expenses, with which a militia formed into
regiments of foot and horse in time of peace is attended.
in such a camp the youth would not only be taught the
exercise of a musket with a few evolutions, which is all
that men in ordinary militias pretend to, and is the least
part of the duty of a soldier; but besides a great many
exercises to strengthen and dispose the body for fight,
they would learn to fence, to ride, and manage a horse for
the war; to forage and live in a camp; to fortify, attack,
and defend any place; and what is no less necessary, to
undergo the greatest toils, and to give obedience to the
severest orders. Such a militia, by (p.24)sending beyond
seas certain proportions of it, and relieving them from
time to time, would enable us to assist our allies more
powerfully than by standing armies we could ever do. Such
a camp would take away the great difficulty of bringing
men of all conditions, who have passed the time of their
youth, to apply themselves to the use and exercise of
arms; and beginning with them early, when like wax they
may be moulded into any shape, would dispose them to place
their greatest honour in the performance of those
exercises, and inspire them with the fires of military
glory, to which that age is so inclined; which impression
being made upon their youth, would last as long as life.
Such a camp would be as great a school of virtue as of
military discipline: in which the youth would learn to
stand in need of few things; to be content with that small
allowance which nature requires; to suffer, as well as to
act; to be modest, as well as brave; to be as much ashamed
of doing anything insolent or injurious, as of turning
their back upon an enemy; they would learn to forgive
injuries done to themselves, but to embrace with joy the
occasions of dying to revenge those done to their country:
and virtue imbibed in younger years would cast a flavour
to the utmost periods of life. In a word, they would learn
greater and better things than the military art, and more
necessary too, if anything can be more necessary than the
defence of our country. Such a militia might not only
defend a people living in an island, but even such as are
placed in the midst of the most warlike nations of the
world.
Now
till such a militia may be brought to some perfection, our
present militia is not only sufficient to defend us; but
considering the circumstances of the French affairs,
especially with relation to Spain, Britain cannot justly
apprehend an invasion, if the fleet of England, to which
Scotland furnished during the late war seven or eight
thousand seamen, were in such order as it ought to be. And
it can never be the interest of these nations to take any
other share in preserving the balance of Europe, than what
may be performed by our fleet. By which means our money
will be spent amongst ourselves; our trade preserved to
support the charge of the navy; our enemies totally driven
out of the sea, and great numbers of their forces diverted
from opposing the armies of our allies abroad, to the
defence of their own coasts.
If
this method had been taken in the late war, I presume it
would have proved not only more advantageous to us, but
also more serviceable to our allies than that which was
followed. And it is in vain to say, that at this rate we
shall have no allies at all: for the weaker party on
(p.25)the Continent must be contented to accept our
assistance in the manner we think fit to give it, or
inevitably perish. But if we send any forces beyond the
seas to join those of our allies, they ought to be part of
our militia, as has been said, and not standing forces;
otherwise, at the end of every war, the present struggle
will recur, and at one time or other these nations will be
betrayed, and a standing army established: so that nothing
can save us from following the fate of all the other
kingdoms in Europe, but putting our trust altogether in
our fleet and militias, and having no other forces than
these. The sea is the only empire which can naturally
belong to us. Conquest is not our interest, much less to
consume our people and treasure in conquering for others.
To
conclude; if we seriously consider the happy condition of
these nations, who have lived so long under the blessings
of liberty, we cannot but be affected with the most tender
compassion to think that the Scots, who have for so many
ages, with such resolution, defended their liberty against
the Picts, Britons, Romans, Saxons, Danes, Irish, Normans,
and English, as well as against the violence and tyranny
of so many of their own princes; that the English, who,
whatever revolutions their country has been subject to,
have still maintained their rights and liberties against
all attempts; who possess a country, everywhere cultivated
and improved by the industry of rich husbandman; her
rivers and harbours filled with ships; her cities, towns,
and villages enriched with manufactures; where men of vast
estates live in secure possession of them, and whose
merchants live in as great splendour as the nobility of
other nations: that Scotland which has a gentry born to
excel in arts and arms: that England which has a
commonalty, not only surpassing all those of that degree
which the world can now boast of, but also those of all
former ages, in courage, honesty, good sense, industry,
and generosity of temper; in whose very looks there are
such visible marks of a free and liberal education; which
advantages cannot be imputed to the climate, or to any
other cause, but the freedom of the government under which
they live: I say, it cannot but make the hearts of all
honest men bleed to think, that in their days the felicity
and liberties of such countries must come to a period, if
the parliaments do not prevent it, and his majesty be not
prevailed upon to lay aside the thoughts of mercenary
armies, which, if once established, will inevitably
produce those fatal consequences that have always attended
such forces in the other kingdoms of Europe; violation of
property, decay of trade, oppression of the country by
heavy taxes and quarters, the utmost misery and slavery of
the poorer sort, the ruin of the nobility (p.26)by their
expenses in court and army, deceit and treachery in all
ranks of men, occasioned by want and necessity. Then shall
we see the gentry of Scotland, ignorant through want of
education, and cowardly by being oppressed; then shall we
see the once happy commonalty of England become base and
abject, by being continually exposed to the brutal
insolence of the soldiers; the women debauched by their
lust; ugly and nasty through poverty, and the want of
things necessary to preserve their natural beauty. Then
shall we see that great city, the pride and glory, not
only of our island, but of the world, subjected to the
excessive impositions Paris now lies under, and reduced to
a peddling trade, serving only to foment the luxury of a
court. Then will Britain know what obligations she has to
those who are for mercenary armies.
|